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  In the last decade there has been growing interest in understanding the relationship 
between corruption and economic performance. The empirical evidence suggests that corruption 
conditions the levels of income and productivity and the growth rates of the economies, with 
results that tend more to support the existence of indirect effects through investment as against 
direct effects on productivity. Nevertheless, very few studies have focused on exploring the 
channels through which corruption affects growth, often analyzing its effects on investment 
while dealing with productivity, in the best of cases, only residually. Also, while it is generally 
admitted that corruption may affect the efficiency with which an economy performs, one finds 
hardly any work that studies the actual impact of this variable on efficiency levels.  
  In this context, the objective of the present work is to analyze how corruption influences 
productivity levels and growth rates in a sample of O.E.C.D. countries. To this end, a frontier 
approach will be adopted, allowing one, on the one hand, to study whether corruption conditions 
the efficiency levels at which the economies operate and, on the other, to determine the channels 
through which it can affect productivity growth, whether by influencing improvements in 
relative efficiency levels or by shifting the production frontier.  1. Introduction 
  The problem of corruption is generally associated with the quality of the 
institutions and the functioning of the public sector, so that the literature on corruption 
and economic results is closely related to the study of institutional integrity. This 
literature has undergone major developments in the last decade, stimulated by the 
appearance of various indicators of corruption and institutional quality which have 
enabled numerous empirical studies to be carried out. In general, the empirical evidence 
suggests that corruption leads to lower levels of domestic and foreign investment, less 
productive public expenditure, lower productivity growth and, consequently, slower 
growth rates
1. 
  Corruption is perceived as especially worrisome in less developed countries, 
while developed countries are seen as being in control of corruption. However, as 
Kaufmann (2004) observes, differences in terms of corruption appear mainly between 
certain regions, noting by way of example that differences in the levels of corruption 
between the Nordic countries and the countries of southern Europe are greater than 
between this latter group and the average of the emerging economies. Indeed, although 
the levels of corruption of O.E.C.D. countries are relatively low in comparison with 
those of other countries, there are also notable differences among the O.E.C.D. group. 
Nevertheless, most studies on corruption have considered broad samples including both 
developed and less developed or developing countries, and little work has been done on 
studying the effects of corruption in O.E.C.D. countries. 
  Studies on the relationship between corruption and economic activity have 
tended to centre on how corruption affects investment or production growth while the 
impact of this variable on productivity has received less attention. Moreover, efficient 
                                                 
1 For a review of the empirical literature on corruption and economic activity, see Jain (2001). 
Bardhan (1997) gives a detailed review of the theoretical literature on corruption. behaviour is generally assumed when studying productivity, thus making it impossible 
to investigate how corruption influences the efficiency at which different economies 
perform. The principal motivation of the present work is to study whether corruption 
affects the economic results of O.E.C.D. countries from a productivity-based 
perspective. A frontier approach is adopted, allowing one to estimate the relative 
efficiency levels with which the different economies operate, with the aim of analyzing 
whether corruption has an influence on the estimated levels of efficiency and the paths 
by which it can affect productivity growth. 
  In accordance with these objectives, the work is structured as follows: Section 2 
presents a brief review of work concerning the effects of corruption on economic 
activity, with particular emphasis paid to the aspects related to efficiency and 
productivity growth. Section 3 studies the relationship between corruption and 
productivity in O.E.C.D. countries. A frontier approach is adopted to estimate the 
relative efficiency levels, and productivity growth is decomposed into efficiency gains 
and shifts of the production frontier by means of Malmquist productivity indices. These 
estimates are used to study whether corruption conditions the efficiency levels and 
productivity growth rates. Lastly, Section 4 presents the main conclusions of this work. 
 
2. Corruption and economic performance 
  It has sometimes been argued that corruption may promote efficiency by 
enabling private agents to correct existing government failures. Therefore, arguments 
that stress the positive effects of corruption are based on ideas coming from "second-
best" theory -given a set of distortions created by governmental procedures or policies, 
corruption would permit agents to evade those regulations that hinder economic 
activity, acting to "grease the wheels" of the economy (Leff 1964; Huntington 1968). In contrast to the hypothesis that corruption favours efficiency, emphasis is generally 
given to the problem posed by the implicit assumption that government failures are 
exogenous and independent of corruption, when in reality such distortions and 
corruption may be closely linked to each other. In this sense, corrupt politicians or 
bureaucrats may introduce excessive regulation precisely because of its potential for 
corruption, with the objective of attracting more offers of bribes. Also, most of the 
literature stresses that corruption leads to inefficient allocations by altering the 
incentives of economic agents, with a part of the economy's resources being used in the 
search for parties interested in participating in corruption activities, and in keeping those 
activities hidden, instead of being devoted directly to productive activities. 
  The effects of corruption on economic results are not limited to its impact on 
efficiency, but extend to different variables that condition economic growth. In 
particular, the literature tends to focus on the negative effects of corruption on 
investment. Payment of bribes in order to get licenses, and the uncertainty that these 
activities introduce with respect to guarantees and property rights, tend to reduce the 
incentives for investment. Also, productive investment may be reduced as its 
profitability relive to that of "investment" in rent-seeking activities diminishes, and thus 
corruption will have an expulsion effect on productive investment. Furthermore, 
corruption can affect public investment by reducing fiscal revenue and distorting public 
expenditure, affecting negatively the rates of growth. 
  The literature on economic growth tends to note that capital accumulation can 
not by itself explain economic growth, but lays the emphasis on productivity growth as 
the determining factor of growth (Easterly and Levine 2001; Caselli 2005). In this 
sense, it is interesting to study whether corruption, apart from conditioning the level of 
productivity, also affects its growth rate. The relationship between corruption and productivity growth could manifest itself in different ways. For one thing, corruption 
can distort the allocation of human resources, generating incentives that lead the best 
qualified people to devote themselves to rent-seeking activities instead of productive or 
innovative activities, thus negatively affecting economic growth (Baumol 1990; 
Murphy et al. 1991). For another, corruption could also negatively affect innovation 
activities since the development of new products is usually closely linked to obtaining 
permits and licenses, and to the protection of the property rights of the innovations 
through patents, all of which may be directly affected by corruption. Moreover, Aidt et 
al. (2005) suggest that corruption could reduce productivity growth through two 
mechanisms: by its negative impact on innovation and, also, by reducing learning-by-
doing externalities, thereby limiting the possibilities of exploiting previous technology 
developed by other economies. 
  Most of the empirical work analyzing the influence of corruption on 
productivity, investment, innovation, and, in sum, economic growth, has been based on 
cross-sectional analysis for different samples of countries. Many have used growth 
equations in which investment is included as a determining variable. When variables 
designed to measure some aspect of institutional quality are also introduced, they are 
interpreted as affecting the efficiency or productivity of investment, thereby having a 
direct effect on growth. These variables could also have an indirect effect on growth if 
they also influence the volume of investment. In this case, another equation is specified 
in order to analyze whether those variables do indeed affect the levels of investment. 
Sometimes, growth equations are estimated in a reduced form, where the investment 
variable is replaced by a set of variables that determine it. This allows the overall effect 
of corruption on growth to be analyzed although, as both direct and indirect effects are picked up together, it is not possible to differentiate the mechanisms through which this 
influence manifests itself. 
  In general, the empirical evidence points to a negative impact of corruption on 
economic growth. In the pioneering work of Mauro (1995), based on a production 
function where growth is a function of investment, the effects of institutional quality 
(property rights, bureaucracy, corruption) on growth and investment are estimated 
separately. It is found that an unfavourable institutional framework reduces investment, 
and the possibility that corruption affects economic growth by influencing governments' 
choice of projects is pointed out. Additionally, Mauro (1998) analyzes how corruption 
affects the composition of public expenditure, reducing public expenditure on 
education, health, and infrastructure maintenance. Knack and Keefer (1995, 1997) 
examine the effects of different institutional variables on growth. Starting from a 
reduced equation and estimating a structural equation that includes investment, they 
find results that are favourable to the hypothesis that corruption affects growth 
negatively, with an indirect effect through investment. Various studies suggest that 
corruption also affects economic growth due to its negative effects on foreign 
investment (Wei 2000; Hellman et al. 2002) or on trade and business activity 
(Kaufmann 2004). 
  Although most studies analyze the effects of corruption on growth or 
investment, one also finds some work that centres on the direct effects of corruption on 
productivity growth. Thus, Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) show how corruption leads to an 
inefficient allocation of public funds which negatively affects economic growth, by 
increasing the volume of public investment at the same time as reducing its 
productivity. Olson et al. (2000) calculate total factor productivity (TFP) in a residual 
form and then analyze which variables explain its variation across countries. They find results that support the influence of different measures of institutional quality, one of 
which is corruption. 
  Some recent work centres on the analysis of productivity levels instead of 
growth rates. This approach is based on the idea that the quantity of inputs and the 
efficiency with which these are transformed are determined by the country's institutions, 
which therefore condition the output level of the economy. Hence, institutional 
variables seem to influence not only the growth rate of an economy but also its income 
or productivity levels (Rodrik et al. 2004). In this vein, Hall and Jones (1999) find that 
disparities in physical and human capital only partially explain the differences in 
product per worker, a great part of them being due to differences in the Solow residual. 
These authors find that differences in productivity are fundamentally due to the 
differences existing in the institutions and governmental policies, which they term 
“social infrastructure”
2. Lambsdorff (2003) studies how corruption affects the 
productivity of capital, suggesting that the negative impact of corruption on productivity 
is manifest in the correlation of this variable with a poor quality of the bureaucracy. 
  In sum, the available empirical evidence suggests that corruption conditions an 
economy's income and productivity levels and growth rate, with results that are 
generally more favourable to the existence of indirect effects through investment as 
against direct effects on productivity. However, it is worth noting that most of the works 
that study the channels through which corruption affects growth have centred on 
analyzing its effects on investment, while dealing with its effects on productivity, in the 
best of cases, only residually. Also, while it is generally admitted that corruption may 
affect the efficiency with which an economy performs, there is little work that studies 
                                                 
2 These authors define "social infrastructure" as the set of institutions and government policies 
that influence the individual incentives of economic agents. These incentives may foster 
productive activities, investment, or the development of new techniques, or, on the contrary, 
they may lead to predatory behaviour such as corruption or rent-seeking. the actual impact of this variable on efficiency levels. Thus, most of the studies based 
on production functions or growth accounting assume that the economies operate 
efficiently, producing the maximum output attainable from the available resources and 
technology. However, as Olson et al. (2000) observe, the attainable level of production 
could be limited by the structure of incentives inherent in the institutional or political 
framework, so that workers or enterprises might not have enough incentives to use the 
available resources or technology efficiently. 
  Some recent studies analyzing the effects of institutional quality on productivity 
have indeed considered the possibility that the economies operate in an inefficient way. 
A stochastic frontier approach is adopted in the work of Adkins et al. (2002), Klein and 
Luu (2003), Méon and Weill (2005) and Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2005), who 
study the relationship between such variables as economic and political freedoms, or 
different governmental indicators, and the estimated efficiency levels. Using a non-
parametric estimate of the production frontier, Lall et al. (2002) and Cherchye and 
Moesen (2003) focus on studying the processes of convergence, analyzing how 
different institutional variables contribute to convergence by favouring relative 
improvements in terms of efficiency. 
 
3. Productivity and corruption in O.E.C.D. countries 
  In this work a non-parametric frontier approach is adopted in order to study the 
influence of corruption on productivity levels and growth rates. This will allow one, on 
the one hand, to analyze whether corruption conditions the efficiency levels at which the 
economies operate and, on the other, to determine the channels through which it can 
affect productivity growth, whether by influencing improvements in relative efficiency 
levels or by shifting the production frontier.  
3.1. Efficiency levels and decomposition of TFP growth 
  In order to study the efficiency with which productive inputs are employed, it is 
necessary to estimate a production frontier which represents the maximum technically 
attainable level of production. An economy's relative inefficiency level will then be 
regarded as the difference between the level of production actually obtained and the 
production frontier. Productivity growth may be due to a more efficient use of the inputs 
for a given productive capacity or to technological improvements allowing an increase 
in that capacity. In this sense, one of the advantages of adopting a frontier approach is 
that productivity growth can be decomposed into technical progress (represented by a 
shift of the production frontier) and gains in relative efficiency (represented by a 
movement towards the technological frontier). It also allows to study through which 
paths corruption can affect productivity growth. One shall use a non-parametric 
technique -Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
3- to estimate the production frontier and 
the associated efficiency levels of each of the economies. Variations in total factor 
productivity will be estimated by means of Malmquist productivity indices which in 
turn are decomposed into technical progress and changes in relative efficiency, allowing 
one to analyze which part of productivity growth is due to each of these factors
4.  
  This analysis is illustrated in Fig. 1, which is based on the case of a single input 
(X) and a single output (Y) in order to simplify the representation. The pairs (Xt, Yt) 
and (Xt+1, Yt+1) represent observed values for an economy while the maximum 
potential production in periods t and t+1 (points E and A) correspond to the reference 
                                                 
3 Data Envelopment Analysis is one of the most commonly used techniques among non-
parametric approaches. The advantage of the latter is their greater flexibility since they neither 
require a particular functional form to be specified for the technology nor any assumption to be 
made about the distribution of the inefficiency term. 
4 A formal presentation of the Malmquist productivity indices and their decomposition is given 
in the Appendix. technology (St and St+1). As one observes, productivity growth may be due to either an 
approximation to the frontier or to a shift of the production frontier itself. The change in 
relative efficiency (term EC in equation A.5 in the appendix) represents movements 
towards the frontier, and is shown graphically by the distance OF-OE and OB-OA. 
Likewise, technological change (term TC in equation A.5) is measured by the geometric 
mean of the shift of the frontier in period t (the distance OE-OC) and t+1 (the distance 
OD-OA). 
 
Figure 1: Decomposition of TFP growth 














  The sample used in this study refers to 22 O.E.C.D. countries and covers the 
period 1980-2000
5. In each case, a single output -the Gross Domestic Product- and two 
inputs -capital and labour- are considered. The capital stock estimates are taken from 
Kamps (2004). They were calculated by means of the permanent inventory method 
based on historical investment series for the O.E.C.D.
6 These estimates are presented in 
three categories: private non-residential capital; residential stock; and public capital. 
                                                 
5 The 22 countries of the sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Holland, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. 
6 See Kamps (2004) for a detailed explanation of the sources and methods used to estimate the 
capital stock series. Residential capital was excluded since it is not linked to productive activity, so the 
measure of capital stock adopted in the present study includes both (non-residential) 
private and public capital. Data on real production was obtained from this same source, 
with both variables being expressed in terms of constant 1995 dollars. Labour is 
measured in annual hours worked, as estimated by the GGDC from the number of 
people employed in the economy and the hours worked per employee, according to data 
of the OECD and national sources
7.  
  Table 1 presents a summary of the estimates of the efficiency levels and 
productivity growth. The first row provides descriptive statistics of the estimated 
relative efficiency for our sample of O.E.C.D. countries in the period 1980-2000, and 
the second row the statistics relating to TFP growth, which is decomposed into relative 
efficiency change and technological change (third and fourth rows, respectively). Also, 
the last two rows give the statistics relating to the level and growth of productivity as 
measured conventionally (real production per hour worked). As one observes, the mean 
efficiency level in O.E.C.D. countries during these years was around 85%. 
Nevertheless, there were notable differences between countries in terms of productivity, 
with these differences being more marked when both capital and labour were considered 
as productive factors than when productivity was measured only with respect to the 
hours worked. Thus, in contrast to countries that tended to be located on the production 
frontier throughout almost the whole period (i.e., Belgium and France, and Canada until 
1995), there was a minimal level of relative efficiency (in the case of Portugal) that 
hardly reached 56%. With respect to productivity growth, this was close to 2% per 
annum in terms of hours worked, while TFP growth was, on average, around 1% per 
annum, with variations between the economies being similar for the two indicators. It is 
                                                 
7 Groningen Growth and Development Centre (GGDC): Total Economy Database (August, 
2005). Detail of sources and methods in http://www.ggdc.net. also noteworthy that TFP growth was mainly due to variations in the production 
frontier, while the efficiency levels stayed relatively stable. 
 
Table 1: Productivity levels and growth: statistical summary 
  Mean  St. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
ef_80_00  0,856868  0,1052266  0,5609  0,9980 
tfp_ch_80_00  1,009498  0,0082720  0,9946  1,0308 
ef_ch_80_00  0,999632  0,0075098  0,9889  1,0149 
tec_ch_80_00  1,010154  0,0033454  1,0029  1,0157 
GDP/L_80_00  0,033753  0,0107743  0,0138  0,0488 
GDP/L_ch_80_00  1,019158  0,0082053  1,0061  1,0422 
 
 
3.2. Corruption effects on productivity 
  The empirical literature on corruption has frequently adopted different measures 
of institutional quality, covering variables related to the attributes of the institutions and 
the evaluation of their performance. In the last few years, however, there have appeared 
different measures of corruption that have contributed significantly to the development 
of this literature
8. 
  On the one hand, there is an extensive set of indicators prepared by international 
organisations or private agencies with the objective of evaluating companies' investment 
opportunities in third countries. By the mid-1990s, two of the most frequently used sets 
of indicators in the literature on corruption were those of Business International (BI), 
applied in the pioneering work of Mauro (1995), and those of International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG), applied in Knack and Keefer (1995) and in Mauro (1998). They 
both consist of a series of indices relating to different institutional variables (amongst 
                                                 
8 Aron (2000: 107-113) gives a summary of the institutional indicators most commonly used in 
the empirical literature, distinguishing between objective and subjective measures. Also Jain 
(2001: 117-121) offers a synthesis of the different institutional measures commonly employed 
in the literature on corruption. Johnston (2001) discusses in detail the measurement and analysis 
of different indices of corruption. others: bureaucratic efficiency, political stability, and institutional efficiency, in the case 
of BI; quality of the bureaucracy, contract guarantees, and property rights or risk of 
expropriation, in the case of ICRG), although they also include partial indicators of 
corruption. 
  On the other hand, together with agencies that elaborate indicators aimed at 
evaluating investment risks and opportunities, other organisms have a perspective 
oriented towards the fight against corruption. This has recently given rise to the 
development of specific indicators of corruption, outstanding amongst which are those 
of Transparency International (TI) and the World Bank
9. Both are composite indicators, 
aggregating various indices elaborated from surveys carried out by different organisms. 
TI's corruption perception indices (CPI) have probably been the most extensively used 
in the recent empirical literature on corruption. These indicators, elaborated from 
opinion surveys and studies conducted among business people and analysis, have been 
published annually since 1995. In addition, CPIs have been constructed for the period 
1980-85 (from the Business International and Political Risk Service databases), and for 
the period 1988-92 (using, as well as the two foregoing databases, those of the World 
Competitiveness Report and of the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy). 
  In the present work different indicators of corruption are employed in order to 
check whether the results are robust to different measures of corruption. In particular, 
one uses those of Mauro (1995), which refers to the period 1980-83, and of Knack and 
Keefer (1995), which refers to the period 1980-89. Both indicators were taken from 
Easterly and Levine (1997). The CPI corresponding to the first half of the 1980s (1980-
85) is also considered. Hence, the different corruption indicators employed refer to 
                                                 
9 The World Bank indicators comprise six measures of governmental quality, with one of them 
corresponding to the control of corruption. In particular, the six measures are: (i) voice and 
accountability; (ii) political stability; (iii) government effectiveness; (iv) regulatory quality; (v) 
rule of law; and (vi) control of corruption. similar years -which coincide with the beginning of the period considered in this study- 
and have been extensively used in the empirical literature. Table 2 presents a statistical 
summary of these indicators and Table 3 gives the partial correlations between them. In 
all the cases, greater values of the indices correspond to less corruption. The CPI and 
the Mauro indicator are on a scale whose maximum is 10, while the maximum value on 
the scale of the Knack and Keefer indicator is 6. One observes in Table 2 that there exist 
some differences between these measures of corruption. The Knack and Keefer 
indicator has the least variation for our sample of countries while the CPI and Mauro 
indicators have quite a similar dispersion, although the Mauro indicator tends to have 
slightly higher values than the CPI. In spite of these differences, however, the partial 
correlations between the three indicators are very strong, between 0.85 and 0.925 with a 
significance level of 99%. 
 
Table 2: Corruption indicators: statistical summary 
  Mean  St. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
CPI_80_85  7,676818  1,3739390  4,2000  9,3000 
Corrup_K&K  5,380682  0,7329178  3,8125  6,0000 
Corrup_Mauro  9,113636  1,2044740  6,2500  10,0000 
 
Table 3: Corruption indicators: partial correlations 
  CPI_80_85  Corrup_K&K  Corrup_Mauro
CPI_80_85  1  0,888 (*)  0,925 (*) 
Corrup_K&K    1  0,848 (*) 
Corrup_Mauro      1 
Pearson correlation. (*) Correlation significant at 99%. 
 
  First, the effects of corruption on productivity levels are estimated. The results 
are presented in Table 4, including the estimates with a conventional measure of 
productivity (production per hour worked) and with the efficiency measure in the 
frontier approach considering both capital and labour as productive factors. The estimates point to a negative impact of corruption on productivity, with a positive 
correlation between the corruption indicators (higher values indicate less corruption) 
and productivity levels. This negative effect tends to be greater with regard to the level 
of efficiency estimated by the frontier approach, although it is more significant in the 
case of the production per hour worked. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the Mauro 
and CPI indicators give quite similar results whereas the Knack and Keefer indicator 
shows a greater effect on productivity but with a lower significance level. 
 
Table 4: Corruption and productivity: effects on productivity levels 
 GDP/L_80_00  Ef_80_00 












CPI_80_85  0.00346892 
(2.20583)** 
   0.0323219 
(2.08184)* 
  
Corrup_K&K   0.00614826 
(2.05913)* 
   0.0525814 
(1.76015)* 
 
Corrup_Mauro     0.00389221 
(2.1612)** 
   0.0354632 
(1.98639)* 
          
σ ˆ   0.009901 0.010028 0.009941  0.097752 0.100334  0.098542 
R
2 (adjust.)  0.155462 0.133664 0.148791  0.137011 0.908357  0.123018 
t-statistic in parentheses; *** significant at 99%; ** significant at 95%; * significant at 90%. 
 
  Malmquist productivity indices calculated in the previous section are used to 
estimate the effects of corruption on productivity growth. This allows to study whether 
corruption has a significant effect on the TFP growth rates, and, if so, whether this 
effect is apparent through variations in relative efficiency or shifts of the production 
frontier. In studying productivity growth, one must bear in mind that it can be 
conditioned by the economy's base efficiency level. In this sense, one would expect the 
initial efficiency level to be positively correlated with technological change, since this 
will be the way followed by economies that are already highly efficient in order to 
increase their productivity. Initially less efficient economies, however, could raise their 
productivity by improving their relative efficiency, so that one would expect a negative correlation between initial efficiency and efficiency gains. Since these are two contrary 
effects, the total effect of the initial efficiency level on TFP growth is difficult to 
anticipate. 
  
  Table 5 presents the results of estimating the effects of corruption on 
productivity growth, also considering how the initial level of productivity affects its 
growth rate. In examining the relationship between the initial level of efficiency and 
TFP growth, one finds evidence favourable for a process of convergence in terms of 
productivity among the O.E.C.D. countries -the economies that start out from lower 
levels of relative efficiency have, on average, a greater TFP growth. Corruption also 
affects productivity growth, with the economies showing lower levels of corruption 
being those that have faster growth rates. Again, the results using the Mauro and CPI 
indices were very similar, while the coefficient estimated with the Knack and Keefer 
index was less significant (although it remained significant at a 90% level). 
Nonetheless, all three indicators point to corruption having a negative effect on TFP 
growth. 
 
Table 5: Corruption and productivity: effects of productivity growth rates 
 tfp_ch_80_00 












CPI_80_85  0.00300453 
(2.48118)** 
  
Corrup_K&K   0.00421899 
(1.78432)* 
 
Corrup_Mauro     0.00333172 
(2.43908)** 
      
σ ˆ   0.007118 0.007580  0.007147 
R
2 (adjust.)  0.259602 0.160395  0.253455 
t-statistic in parentheses; *** significant at 99%; ** significant at 95%; * significant at 90%. 
   The results of estimating the impact of corruption on the components of TFP 
growth -variations in relative efficiency and shifts in the technological frontier- are 
presented in Tables 6 and 7. Firstly, one notes that the aforementioned process of 
productivity convergence is the result of the gains in efficiency undergone by the 
initially less efficient economies, without the initial efficiency level being significantly 
correlated with shifts of the production frontier. Hence, Table 7 also presents the results 
of the estimates made by excluding the initial efficiency level in studying the effects of 
corruption on technological change. With respect to the effects of corruption on the 
components of the TFP, one observes that, while this variable shows the expected sign, 
it does not reach significance in explaining the variations in efficiency. This suggests 
that, at least in the group of O.E.C.D. countries, corruption does not limit the less 
productive economies' possibilities of exploiting the existing technology. Corruption 
has, however, a negative influence on technological change (at a significance level of 
99% with the CPI indicator, and 95% with the Mauro indicator), suggesting that the 
negative effect of corruption on the TFP growth is manifested through its impact on 
shifts of the production frontier. 
 
Table 6: Corruption and efficiency change 
 ef_ch_80_00 












CPI_80_85  0.00141377 
(1.19475) 
  
Corrup_K&K   0.00257983 
(1.18856) 
 
Corrup_Mauro     0.00187532 
(1.4321) 
      
σ ˆ   0.006955 0.006958  0.006852 
R
2 (adjust.)  0.142179 0.141559  0.167586 
t-statistic in parentheses; *** significant at 99%; ** significant at 95%; * significant at 90%.  
Table 7: Corruption and technological change 
 tec_ch_80_00 























    









        
σ ˆ   0.002924 0.002902 0.003361 0.003280 0.003152 0.003092 
R
2 (adjust.)  0.23596 0.247506  0.0000  0.38969 0.111982  0.145738 
t-statistic in parentheses; *** significant at 99%; ** significant at 95%; * significant at 90%. 
 
4. Conclusions 
  Studies of the relationship between corruption and economic activity have often 
noted that, because of the distortions that it introduces into the incentives of economic 
agents, corruption may condition the efficiency with which productive resources are 
used. Nevertheless, most of these studies implicitly assume that the economies operate 
efficiently, producing the maximum output attainable from the resources and 
technology available, and one finds hardly any work that has inquired into the impact of 
corruption on efficiency levels. In the present work a frontier approach has been 
adopted in order to study the efficiency with which productive inputs are used, 
estimating a production frontier that represents the maximum technically attainable 
level of production and the associated levels of relative efficiency. The sample 
considered referred to 22 O.E.C.D. countries during the period 1980-2000. The results 
using different corruption indicators showed that this variable affects negatively the 
efficiency levels at which these economies perform. 
  The literature on corruption suggests that corruption does not only condition an 
economy's productivity level, but also its rate of growth. Most empirical work has stressed the influence of corruption on growth through its indirect effects on investment, 
while its effects on productivity growth have been less studied. In this sense, one of the 
advantages of adopting a frontier approach is to decompose productivity growth into 
gains in relative efficiency and shifts of the production frontier. This allows one to study 
the paths through which corruption can influence productivity growth. The results 
suggested that corruption affects TFP growth, with economies that have lower levels of 
corruption recording, on average, faster growth rates. This negative effect of corruption 
on productivity growth is manifest through its impact on shifts of the technological 
frontier, while its influence was not found to be significant in explaining the variations 
of efficiency in O.E.C.D. countries. 
  Corruption is generally associated with problems of development of the less 
advanced economies. Nonetheless, despite the lower levels of corruption perceived in 
the O.E.C.D. countries, the results of the present study suggest that corruption also 
represents an economic problem for many of the more developed economies, since it 
conditions both their productivity levels and their rates of technological progress, 




 Let  S
t be the technology of production at period t (t=1,...T): 
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where X
t and Y
t are the vectors of inputs and outputs, respectively. 
  Following Shephard (1970), the distance function at period t is defined as
10: 
                                                 
10 The subscript o refers to output based distance functions. See Färe (1988) for a discussion of 
input and output distance functions. } ) , ( : { min ) , (
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which allows a perfect characterization of the technology, since 
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  In order to define the Malmquist productivity index, we need to relate the input 
and output vectors at period t to the technology of the next period, S
t+1: 
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t t t t t t
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  Similarly, we could define  ) , (
1 1 + + t t t
o Y X D , where the input and output vectors at 
period t+1would be related to the period t technology.  
  On the basis of the above concepts, Färe et al. (1994) define the following 
Malmquist productivity index: 
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  As it can be observed, this index is the geometric mean of two Malmquist 
indices, the first related to the technology of period t, and the second to the technology 
of period t+1
11.  
  This is in fact an index of productivity change between period t and t+1 and can 
be decomposed into efficiency change (EC) -change in relative efficiency between 
periods t and t+1- and technological change (TC) -the geometric mean of the shift in the 
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11 A similar productivity index, based on Malmquist (1953), was proposed by Caves et al. 






t+1) to be equal to unity, so 
that technical inefficiencies were not considered.   In order to estimate the component distance functions of the Malmquist index, 
we use the data envelopment analysis (DEA)
12 non-parametric technique of linear 
programming. By assuming constant returns to scale
13 and exploiting the fact that the 
distance functions can be estimated as reciprocals of Farrell efficiency measures
14, the 
specific problem to calculate  ) , (
t t t
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  The other three distance functions are calculated similarly, substituting the 
appropriate period index (i.e. t or t+1).  
 
                                                 
12 Method developed by Charnes et al. (1978), based on Farrell (1957) technical efficiency 
measures. 
13 Grifell-Tatjé and Lovell (1995) show that the Malmquist index may not be an accurate 
measure of TFP change when non-constant returns are assumed. Furthermore, the constant 
returns to scale assumption is sufficient condition to guarantee that the optimization problem 
has a solution. 
14 Specifically, 
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where  ) , ( t Y t X t
o F  is the Farrell output based measure of technical efficiency. References 
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